Washington Wants a Say Over Your Minister

I wonder if “we” haven’t asked for this to some extent. Saying that everyone who works for a Christian organization is in “the ministry” leads to the inevitable conclusion that they’re “ministers” (unless, of course, they’re trying to say that their job is a ministry in order to get out of weekly visitation or a Sunday “ministry”—then it’s just their “job”). And then the church uses that designation to its financial advantage.

For example, how are a church/school’s business manager and school administrator “ministers,” in the classic sense of the term? Answer: Call him a “pastor”…give him the responsibility of teaching a Sunday school class…make sure he speaks in chapel occasionally…give him a parsonage or parsonage allowance?

It’ll be very interesting to see how the SC rules on this.

Actually, the tax code is pretty restrictive in this sense already. You must be ordained and performing sacerdotal functions to claim the tax exemptions for a minister. So Bryan, your example of the business manager would not fit the tax code allowances.

[Chip Van Emmerik] Actually, the tax code is pretty restrictive in this sense already. You must be ordained and performing sacerdotal functions to claim the tax exemptions for a minister. So Bryan, your example of the business manager would not fit the tax code allowances.

While that’s technically correct, I know churches where it’s being done; that is, business managers, school administrators, etc. are given (by the church) the tax exemptions that should be reserved for true “ministers.” They justify it—at least in their own minds—by having said “pastors” teach a SS class or 1 time a quarter lead prayer meeting and possibly help with communion: things that have nothing to do with their real jobs, they’re added on to legitmate titles and tax benefits.

Nevertheless, the case reported in the WSJ article in the OP isn’t about the tax code. The church in question is arguing that they are not subject to the Americans with Disabilities Act & the jurisdiction of the EEOC because the employee was a “minister.” In reality, she was a teacher in their church-run school. The church considered her a “minister” because she shared devotions with the kids (and possibly simply by virtue of being employed by the church?). From the info shared in the article, it appears the moniker “minister” was applied to this teacher as a convenient way to get out of the responsibility to treat her fairly & justly (at least as it’s currently defined by employment laws). So in my example, if the disenfranchised employee had been a business mgr or school admin, the church would make the same claim of exemption from the ADA — the business mgr./school admin can’t sue because they’re “ministers.”

Surely I muddied the waters a bit by bringing in the ideas of “financial advantage” and “parsonage allowance.” But my main point is that on our end, we’re far too ready to use the title “minister” to our advantage — whether by abusing the tax code or by abusing employees.

[BryanBice] Surely I muddied the waters a bit by bringing in the ideas of “financial advantage” and “parsonage allowance.” But my main point is that on our end, we’re far too ready to use the title “minister” to our advantage — whether by abusing the tax code or by abusing employees.

Bryan,

I am not sure who you have an axe to grind against, but I do think you are really muddying the waters. The tax laws are very clear about who can be treated as a minister — which is basically the same group that can get a parsonage allowance and must also decide if they are in or out of social security. If it is wrong to take advantage of these things within the law, then is it also wrong to claim a tax credit for children, a mortgage or anything else?

But beyond that, this case apparently has nothing to do with that at all on several levels. To understand it, you have to realize that this is an LC-MS school. The LC-MS has a strict definition of a “called” worker which is distinct even from other confessional Lutheran bodies, such as WELS.

Thus, I really believe that your concerns are completely outside anything having to do with what is going on in this case.

I have not studied the situation in any great detail and am not an attorney, but I pray that the Court will rule in such a way to preserve the utmost respect for religious freedom as well as personal responsibility and liberty. I am always fearful that usually nothing good can come of something like this going through the legal process — unless it serves to reiterate Constitutional freedom.

From the story…

“As relations broke down, the church congregation voted to withdraw her “call” to the ministry, and she ceased to be eligible for her prior job. She sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, with the support of the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission…

But the Obama Justice Department has now asked the court to disavow the ministerial exception altogether. This would mean that, in every future case, a court—and not the church—would decide whether the church’s reasons for firing or not hiring a minister were good enough.”

In other words, the federal government wants to be able to tell churches that they ultimately cannot hire and fire based on any standards other than what any other employer must use.

That would truly have a chilling impact on the “visible church.”

[Paul J. Scharf]

[BryanBice] Surely I muddied the waters a bit by bringing in the ideas of “financial advantage” and “parsonage allowance.” But my main point is that on our end, we’re far too ready to use the title “minister” to our advantage — whether by abusing the tax code or by abusing employees.

Bryan,

I am not sure who you have an axe to grind against, but I do think you are really muddying the waters. The tax laws are very clear about who can be treated as a minister — which is basically the same group that can get a parsonage allowance and must also decide if they are in or out of social security. If it is wrong to take advantage of these things within the law, then is it also wrong to claim a tax credit for children, a mortgage or anything else?

But beyond that, this case apparently has nothing to do with that at all on several levels. To understand it, you have to realize that this is an LC-MS school. The LC-MS has a strict definition of a “called” worker which is distinct even from other confessional Lutheran bodies, such as WELS.

Thus, I really believe that your concerns are completely outside anything having to do with what is going on in this case.

I have not studied the situation in any great detail and am not an attorney, but I pray that the Court will rule in such a way to preserve the utmost respect for religious freedom as well as personal responsibility and liberty. I am always fearful that usually nothing good can come of something like this going through the legal process — unless it serves to reiterate Constitutional freedom.

I’m not trying to complicate things, nor do I have a particular axe to grind. I’m simply pointing out that the term “minister” has been broadened beyond the common understanding of “a member of the clergy,” which is defined as “a body of religious officials authorized to conduct [religious] services.” I don’t see how business managers, school administrators, and school teachers fit that traditional definition just because their paycheck comes from a church or Christian school. Well….unless we’re going to redefine religious services, too.

Incidentally, I have no problem with clergy taking advantage of tax benefits, since I receive a bunch of them as a pastor. I do have a problem with churches abusing tax laws in the ways I described in an earlier post—it’s a sure way to invite unnecessary scrutiny, further encroachment, and restricted freedoms. In the WSJ story, for example, (again, NOT a tax code issue) the church is claiming exemption from treating the teacher according to the ADA because she’s a “minister.” It’s that apparent redefinition or stretching of the meaning of the term that has invited the scrutiny & may lead to further government encroachment and restricted religious freedom. That’s certainly not something I would desire, either, Paul.

OK Bryan,

We probably agree on most of this.

But I think you are still reading a “non-denom” Christian school paradigm into the situation.

This is a Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod church school — something that has been around in this country for a century. They have a strict definition of a “called worker.” They didn’t make it up to take advantage of the tax code or anything else.

[Paul J. Scharf] OK Bryan,

We probably agree on most of this.

But I think you are still reading a “non-denom” Christian school paradigm into the situation.

This is a Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod church school — something that has been around in this country for a century. They have a strict definition of a “called worker.” They didn’t make it up to take advantage of the tax code or anything else.

Well, actually, I’m thinking of IFB church schools. One huge difference is the LCMS schools actually spell out a “called worker” and, from what the WSJ reports, vote to confirm and/or rescind the call. That, of course, doesn’t happen with IFB churches/schools in relation to Admins, Bus Mgrs, and teachers. Although some do go so far as to license male staff to preach so they can get “ministerial benefits.”

Incidentally, here’s an update on the case: http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/justices-hear-religious-workplace-disput….

This statement by the school’s attorney gets to the heart of the matter (the lack of clear definition of “minister”):

He urged the justices to rule that any employee who is a commissioned minister or who teaches religion, irrespective of other duties, is a “minister” and barred from suing. In his written filing, Laycock asserted that while judges have long recognized a “ministerial exception” in employment litigation, determining who is covered has been difficult.

“They agree that it extends beyond pastors, priests, and rabbis, but not as far as janitors or secretaries,” he said. “The question is where to draw the line.”

And this approach from Kennedy touches on the issue of justice for a potentially wrongfully terminated employee:

Justice Anthony Kennedy, often a crucial vote on the most contentious cases, homed in the fact that Perich was claiming retaliation under disabilities law and “can’t even get a hearing.”

“You’re asking for an exemption so these cases can’t even be tried,” Kennedy told Laycock.

And Sotomayor raised an interesting scenario:

Justice Sonia Sotomayor, for example, wondered about a teacher who reported child sexual abuse to the government and was fired because of the report. Laycock [the school’s attorney] said that was “a difficult case” and that an exception to his rule might arise when the safety of children was at issue.

Here’s another article from the NY Times on this issue… http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/is-religion-above-the-l…

If the ministerial exemption is to have any bite, there must be a way of distinguishing employees central to a religious association’s core activities from employees who play only a supporting role (the example always given is janitors). But if the line marking the distinction is drawn by the state, the state is setting itself up as the arbiter of ecclesiastical organization and thus falling afoul of the establishment clause. And if the line is drawn by the religious association, the religious association is being granted the power to deprive as many of its employees as it likes of the constitutional protections supposedly afforded to every citizen. It is these equally unpalatable alternatives — this Scylla and Charybdis — that the justices find themselves between in oral argument. What a mess!

It is tempting to bypass the mess by getting rid of the ministerial exception altogether and demanding that churches, synagogues and mosques obey the law just as everyone else does. But that draconian solution would imply that we get rid of the religion clause as well; for it would amount to saying that religion isn’t special, and both sides of the clause insist that it is. The free-exercise clause tells us that that religion is especially favored and the establishment clause tells us that it is especially feared (the state should avoid entanglement with that stuff). How do you honor the claims of free exercise without bumping up against the establishment clause by allowing exceptions to laws that everyone else must follow?