Now, About Those Differences, Part Seven
Read Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, and Part 6.
Second Premise Arguments
Making generalizations about either fundamentalists or other evangelicals is a bit presumptuous. Both groups are quite diverse, and exceptions can be found to most generalizations. Non-fundamentalistic evangelicalism covers an especially broad array of influences and movements.
The diversity of each group has rarely been realized by the other, however, and so each group does tend to posit generalizations about the other. One of those generalizations has to do with the matter of worldliness and legalism. Fundamentalists tend to think of other evangelicals as worldly. Those evangelicals tend to think of fundamentalists as legalistic.
We are not yet to the point of weighing the merits of these perceptions. For the moment, what we are trying to do is to understand what each group means when it speaks about the other. What do fundamentalists see that leads them to think evangelicals are worldly? What do evangelicals see that leads them to perceive fundamentalists as legalistic?
Articulating these perceptions more fully will be useful in two ways. First, it will furnish us with criteria for assessing the merits of the judgments that evangelicals and fundamentalists make about each other. Second, it will provide us with a device for distinguishing some evangelicals from other evangelicals as well as some fundamentalists from other fundamentalists.
In a previous discussion, I have suggested that the mutual recriminations of fundamentalists and evangelicals center upon two areas: standards of conduct and methods of ministry. I have further suggested that controversy over standards of conduct centers upon two kinds of issues: revivalistic taboos and second-premise arguments.
By second-premise arguments, I mean those attempts to apply Scripture that rely not only upon a premise supplied by a specific biblical passage or principle but also upon a premise supplied from outside of Scripture. The outside (second) premise may come from any of a variety of sources: intuition, experience, observation, deduction, tradition, or even authority. The second premise provides the warrant for applying the biblical statement or principle to a particular situation.
Here is an example of a second-premise argument.
- Biblical principle: Christians should not engage in enslaving behavior (1 Cor. 6:12).
- Outside premise: The recreational use of heroin is enslaving behavior.
- Conclusion: Christians should not engage in the recreational use of heroin.
What I am trying to do here is to articulate an argument that I think will be acceptable to the majority of both parties. Perhaps there are better ways of making the argument, but very few evangelicals or fundamentalists are actively advocating the recreational use of heroin as a matter of Christian liberty. Most would actually deploy several related arguments to support their stance against the recreational use of heroin: it is addictive, it is physically destructive, it damages the testimony, it is illegal, etc. My point is not to evaluate these arguments. My point is simply that they are all second-premise arguments. They all rely upon some information or perspective that comes from outside of Scripture.
Without second-premise arguments, we would not be able to apply Scripture at all. Because our names do not occur in the text, the applicability of virtually every biblical promise, command, prohibition, and principle depends upon some version of the second-premise argument. This is true even in the matter of salvation. Here is an example.
- Biblical principle: God commands all humans everywhere to repent (Acts 17:30).
- Outside premise: I am a human.
- Conclusion: God commands me to repent.
This argument is so natural for us that we do not even realize that we are making it. Unless we did, however, we could not apply the text to our own situation. The strength of the argument depends upon the certainty of the assertion that we are humans. Since our confidence in this assertion is unshakable, we regard the application of the text as certain.
We regularly employ second-premise arguments in our moral reasoning. For example, consider a woman who is thinking about feeding her husband a large quantity of arsenic. For moral guidance we point her to Exodus 20:13, “Thou shalt not kill.” How do we respond if she asks, “What Scripture tells me that feeding arsenic to my husband will kill him?” We would reply that we do not need such a Scripture. We have other ways of knowing the consequences of ingesting arsenic, and it is precisely those ways that allow us to apply the biblical commandment to her situation.
Both evangelicals and fundamentalists rely upon second-premise arguments in all sorts of ways. When it comes to moral applications, however, I think it is fair to say that the more explicitly an argument relies upon the second premise, the more evangelicals tend to become suspicious of it, while fundamentalists tend to remain unbothered. In other words, many fundamentalists are willing to apply some second-premise arguments that many evangelicals find specious.
What are some examples of second premises over which evangelicals and fundamentalists might differ? Here is a very partial sampling.
- Music is sensual (or rebellious).
- Bikinis are immodest.
- Theater is spiritually subversive.
- Piercings and tattoos are worldly.
These premises pertain to the kind of issues over which fundamentalists and other evangelicals typically differ (though younger fundamentalists are inclined to take the evangelical side). What these premises have in common is that they rely upon an element of judgment. In the case of music, how does one judge whether a particular composition expresses rebellion or sensuality? For that matter, when is it wrong to expose one’s self to expressions of rebellion or sensuality? In the case of bikinis, how much exposure constitutes immodesty? Might this vary depending upon one’s culture? In the case of theater, how and why is it judged to be spiritually subversive? As for piercings and tattoos, are they always and necessarily worldly? If so, what makes them worldly? If not, how can we tell the worldly ones from the non-worldly ones?
Precisely because they do not come from Scripture, second premises are always subject to evaluation. To question a second premise is not to question biblical authority. Second premises can and should be examined.
Fundamentalists have sometimes failed to subject their second premises to careful examination. This failure has resulted in silly and sometimes scandalous applications of Scripture. This is the mechanism that some fundamentalists have used to prohibit slacks for women, ban interracial dating, and insist upon the mandatory use of a particular version of the Bible. One fundamentalist leader spent years denouncing the “demon of the AWANA circle.” No wonder some are skeptical of their judgments.
On the other hand, evangelicals have sometimes refused to accept any second-premise argument that relies upon a judgment. Evaluations of matters like dress or the arts are thought to be too subjective to be useful. In these areas, second-premise arguments are dismissed out of hand.
Neither extreme is really useful, and neither extreme gets one to the correct application of biblical precepts and principles. Of course, neither fundamentalists nor other evangelicals necessarily go to the extreme. Nevertheless, in general they do seem to follow these tendencies. Fundamentalists more readily accept second-premise arguments when the second premise relies upon an element of judgment, while evangelicals more quickly reject those arguments.
The True Christmas
Henry Vaughan (1621-1695)
SO, stick up ivy and the bays,
And then restore the heathen ways.
Green will remind you of the spring,
Though this great day denies the thing ;
And mortifies the earth, and all
But your wild revels, and loose hall.
Could you wear flow’rs, and roses strow
Blushing upon your breasts’ warm snow,
That very dress your lightness will
Rebuke, and wither at the ill.
The brightness of this day we owe
Not unto music, masque, nor show,
Nor gallant furniture, nor plate,
But to the manger’s mean estate.
His life while here, as well as birth,
Was but a check to pomp and mirth ;
And all man’s greatness you may see
Condemned by His humility.
Then leave your open house and noise,
To welcome Him with holy joys,
And the poor shepherds’ watchfulness,
Whom light and hymns from Heav’n did bless.
What you abound with, cast abroad
To those that want, and ease your load.
Who empties thus, will bring more in ;
But riot is both loss and sin.
Dress finely what comes not in sight,
And then you keep your Christmas right.
This essay is by Dr. Kevin T. Bauder, president of Central Baptist Theological Seminary (Plymouth, MN). Not every professor, student, or alumnus of Central Seminary necessarily agrees with every opinion that it expresses.
I had been looking forward to this article, and it did not disappoint. Some Fundamentalists have been especially reluctant to question their second premise arguments with regard to worldliness and sensuality. Furthermore, some have even been unwilling to allow others to question them without casting them out of their circle (or college).
Doctor Bauder rightly makes the point that we cannot apply Scripture at all without second premises, but I think that it is important to make sure that our second premises with regard to Biblical categories (like “worldly” or “carnal”) be grounded in Scriptural definitions of those categories. Furthermore, more work needs to be done in building a theology of the interface between Christianity and culture. I still believe that too much of our thinking is built on Catholic monastic assumptions of what the world is and how it influences us (witness the cultural isolation that some of our more conservative colleges attempt to achieve).
I do not support capitulation to those who want to stop thinking of worldliness as a category and engage the world by becoming nearly identical to it — a fault too many evangelicals fall into. What I would like to see are second premises more grounded in a Biblically-based Christian world-view rather than merely our own tradition. In other words, I’d like to see second premises that move a little more toward first-order force due to careful Biblical exposition.
[Don Johnson] Joel, if you can’t see what makes the music of Resolved worldly, nothing can help you.Brother Don wrote these words in the “Bantam Rooster” thread. Without attempting to re-ignite the controversy there, and without undue criticism, since Don has formed a theology of what he believes constitutes worldliness, I note that this demonstrates one of Dr. Bauder’s points. This statement exemplifies a second premise that Don considered undebateable. Others debated it anyway.
Doctor Bauder rightly makes the point that we cannot apply Scripture at all without second premises, but I think that it is important to make sure that our second premises with regard to Biblical categories (like “worldly” or “carnal”) be grounded in Scriptural definitions of those categories. Furthermore, more work needs to be done in building a theology of the interface between Christianity and culture. I still believe that too much of our thinking is built on Catholic monastic assumptions of what the world is and how it influences us (witness the cultural isolation that some of our more conservative colleges attempt to achieve).
I do not support capitulation to those who want to stop thinking of worldliness as a category and engage the world by becoming nearly identical to it — a fault too many evangelicals fall into. What I would like to see are second premises more grounded in a Biblically-based Christian world-view rather than merely our own tradition. In other words, I’d like to see second premises that move a little more toward first-order force due to careful Biblical exposition.
Who said that Awana was a demon? That is a new one for me.
http://www.awana-mi.com/images/offici1.jpg
If you can’t see the obvious occultic symbolism there, you’ve just been reading too many books by neo evangelicals! J-)
On a more serious note, I appreciate the amount of energy Kevin is putting into thinking clearly about these things. With the “tools of thought” so neglected for so long (this is culture wide, not just fundamentalist), we often have no idea how we’re arriving at conclusions!
If you can’t see the obvious occultic symbolism there, you’ve just been reading too many books by neo evangelicals! J-)
On a more serious note, I appreciate the amount of energy Kevin is putting into thinking clearly about these things. With the “tools of thought” so neglected for so long (this is culture wide, not just fundamentalist), we often have no idea how we’re arriving at conclusions!
Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.
[Mike Durning] Doctor Bauder rightly makes the point that we cannot apply Scripture at all without second premises, but I think that it is important to make sure that our second premises with regard to Biblical categories (like “worldly” or “carnal”) be grounded in Scriptural definitions of those categories. Furthermore, more work needs to be done in building a theology of the interface between Christianity and culture. I still believe that too much of our thinking is built on Catholic monastic assumptions of what the world is and how it influences us (witness the cultural isolation that some of our more conservative colleges attempt to achieve).Mike, I think this would be a discussion worth having. I have been working on defining worldliness, worldly and godliness in a series of articles at oxgoad.ca and in a series of Bible studies at our church (they can be found at gbcvic.org with audio and pdfs of the outlines). It seems to me that you think I am not defining the terms biblically, is that correct? If not, why don’t you write a paper defining these terms biblically and have Aaron publish it here at SI. Then we can have at it. Or, alternatively, we could start a separate thread here, or as a third alternative, we could engage the discussion at oxgoad. I really wouldn’t mind getting into a little more fine-tuning of my thinking in these areas. I have been attempting to derive my arguments from the Scriptures first, then come to conclusions afterwards. Of course, it is probably impossible to do this without prejudice, but that was what I was attempting to do, in any case.
So rather than getting this thread clogged up with that discussion, let’s get into it somewhere else for the purpose of hammering out a better understanding of the terms.
BTW, I don’t much disagree with this article of Kevin’s either. I think he is articulating a true difference between Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism here. I suppose if I looked hard enough I could find a sentence or phrase somewhere that I disagree with, but the basic argument is correct in my opinion. I am sure Kevin will be much relieved to hear this news.
Maranatha!
Don Johnson
Jer 33.3
Is that they are willing to take on the “second premise” and attempt to make applicaitons to culture. Even when you think they are wrong, at least you know there is a respect for the holiness of God and there is an attempt to make delineations between a Christian and what the Bible calls “the world”. The fact is, we can always find someone more “legalistic” than ourselves. And, as Francis Schaeffer correctly observed many years ago, loosening standards generally has less to do with not having taboos and more to do with individuals wanting to overturn specific taboos. We all have standards (even Adam and Eve had them in the Garden), but the question is: what are they and how are they derived and applied?
IMHO, worldliness has to do with the derivation of a “second premise” as well as its application. I have seen specific instances where individual believers sought out a biblical interpretation that suits their actions (i.e. believers changing their stance on divorce and remarriege when they have been divorced and want to remarry). Also, the reason for the application of the second premise can be to suit a specific situation (i.e. a pastor is trying to please recalcitrant church members).
What is greatly needed is a more clear understanding of the balance of being in the world and being of the world. This is a principle that is much discussed in general but very little in specific. It is my hope that the author will take this up in the near future.
IMHO, worldliness has to do with the derivation of a “second premise” as well as its application. I have seen specific instances where individual believers sought out a biblical interpretation that suits their actions (i.e. believers changing their stance on divorce and remarriege when they have been divorced and want to remarry). Also, the reason for the application of the second premise can be to suit a specific situation (i.e. a pastor is trying to please recalcitrant church members).
What is greatly needed is a more clear understanding of the balance of being in the world and being of the world. This is a principle that is much discussed in general but very little in specific. It is my hope that the author will take this up in the near future.
On a more serious note, I appreciate the amount of energy Kevin is putting into thinking clearly about these things. With the “tools of thought” so neglected for so long (this is culture wide, not just fundamentalist), we often have no idea how we’re arriving at conclusions!Totally agree. There is a critical thought deficit in both spheres. If one is engaging in an activity or prohibiting such activity, there should be an articulable purpose for either position. Evangelicals often do what they please with little to no thought beyond their version of Semper Fi…Christian Liberty! Fundamentalists rarely do what they please as they shout their motto, “Avoid all appearances of evil.” The topic should not center around what you can and can’t do, but why do you believe it expedient and edifying to act or not act?. And this should apply to any of life’s commonalities not just the hot button, fire-in-the-forum topics. If we apply critical thought as to our purpose for anything in which we engage, it will help us build a deeper, better nuanced, and more robust systematic worldview that embeds controversial subjects instead of highlighting them.
1) Would someone be so kind as to point me to a technical definition of second premise? It seems Dr. Bauder is making use of syllogism. Is the ‘second premise’, as he uses it, the same as the ‘minor premise’ of a syllogism.
2) Do any fundamentalists believe in sanctification any more? Isn’t the Holy Spirit conforming us to the image of Christ? Shouldn’t we keep our eyes on Christ and not the taboos of the world. It seems there is very little mention of Christ in this 7-part series on those differences that are distinct and yet not different (but really are) series.
2) Do any fundamentalists believe in sanctification any more? Isn’t the Holy Spirit conforming us to the image of Christ? Shouldn’t we keep our eyes on Christ and not the taboos of the world. It seems there is very little mention of Christ in this 7-part series on those differences that are distinct and yet not different (but really are) series.
[Aaron Blumer]Aaron, I couldn’t agree more. Recently on another thread, I put in a plug for Kevin’s excellent series from a few years ago, “Shall We Reason Together?” I’m going to put in another plug here. Anyone who read (and truly digested) that series probably already anticipated much of the content of this latest essay as soon as Kevin mentioned that it would be about “second premise arguments.” (Go to the [URL=http://www.centralseminary.edu/resources/nick-of-time/132-nick-archives] archives [/URL] and scroll down to 9/15/2006.) Kevin practices in his own writing what he teaches in that series. I greaty appreciate the way constructs arguments (meticulously defining terms & premises, then reasoning rather transparently from those premises).
I appreciate the amount of energy Kevin is putting into thinking clearly about these things. With the “tools of thought” so neglected for so long (this is culture wide, not just fundamentalist), we often have no idea how we’re arriving at conclusions!
While some installments of the current essay series have been called “ponderous” by some, I’ve tried to keep in mind that part of what Kevin is doing here is building a taxonomy. And taxonomies, in order to be complete, tend to have some rather dull components. At this point, I’ve received so much benefit from his writing that I’m willing to suspend judgment whenever things start to seem pedantic: Usually, I discover there are good reasons for the extra details.
One of the reasons I enjoy reading Martyn Lloyd-Jones is that often when I read his preaching on a given subject I go away with not just more knowledge of subject itself but also a more biblically and logically-honed framework for thinking about the subject. That, in turn, results in a rich set of follow-on insights that arise from meditating on the implications of what I have learned. Kevin’s preaching and writing also has this quality.
Philip Knight
[Don Johnson]Let me add another vote for creating a separate topic on worldliness and its biblical definition. And while I’m putting in plugs for Kevin’s writing and preaching, let me add one more for his sermon series [URL=http://www.centralseminary.edu/resources/mp3-audio] “Understanding Worldliness: A Biblical Investigation”[/URL]. Part 1 begins on 9/1/2009 (currently page 2 in the listings).
Mike, I think this [topic of worldliness] would be a discussion worth having. I have been working on defining worldliness, worldly and godliness in a series of articles at oxgoad.ca and in a series of Bible studies at our church (they can be found at gbcvic.org with audio and pdfs of the outlines). It seems to me that you think I am not defining the terms biblically, is that correct?
I just listened to this a few weeks ago, so it’s content is fresh in my memory. It contains excellent biblically-based analysis that would shed much light on the recent posts here. Does anyone know if these sermons are available in printed form?
Philip Knight
[AndrewSuttles] 1) Would someone be so kind as to point me to a technical definition of second premise? It seems Dr. Bauder is making use of syllogism. Is the ‘second premise’, as he uses it, the same as the ‘minor premise’ of a syllogism.Andrew,
Follow the link to Kevin’s series “Shall We Reason Together?” in my first post on this thread (about 15 minutes ago).
Philip Knight
http://www.philchristensen.com/subpage30.html
But in Garlock’s world, music isn’t just a tool; music is an entity that is good or bad of itself. It is moral or immoral by its very nature, and cannot be neutral. The sound itself is here to either help you or to hurt you. There’s no middle ground.
He attempts to support this truth by associating it with the character of God Himself. Garlock reasons that since (a) God is musical, and (b) God is moral, therefore (c) music is moral by nature. That’s Frank’s Theorum.
(Note: for fun, try Frank’s Theorum with any other two random attributes of God, and see how it works. Here’s one to get you started: (a) God is kind, and (b) God is unchangeable. Therefore (c) kindness is unchangeable. Kids, you can try Frank’s Theorum at home: Rice is white, and Ralph is white. Therefore, Ralph must be rice. Ask for help from your parents before you put Ralph in the rice cooker. But I digress.)
Frank’s Theorum gives birth to Frank’s Bottom Line: There are only two styles of music: (a) the style which is is moral and “acceptable to the Lord” and (b) the style which is immoral and “unacceptable to the Lord.” It’s a simple binary system. His personal mission statement is found in Eph. 5:10: “Proving what is acceptable unto the Lord.” For those Christians who don’t agree with what he’s proven, he’s clearly adopted the next verse in context: “And have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them.”
So the battle’s on; we’ll either accept what Garlock’s “proven” or be “reproved.” There’s no middle ground, since his definition of unacceptable music is any style that smacks of “worldliness.”
To avoid being reproved, we’ll have to 1) agree with his premise about the morality of music, 2) accept his definition of “worldliness,” and finally we’ll 3) penitently adopt the styles of music he authorizes.
[Don Johnson] Mike, I think this would be a discussion worth having. I have been working on defining worldliness, worldly and godliness in a series of articles at oxgoad.ca and in a series of Bible studies at our church (they can be found at gbcvic.org with audio and pdfs of the outlines). It seems to me that you think I am not defining the terms biblically, is that correct? If not, why don’t you write a paper defining these terms biblically and have Aaron publish it here at SI. Then we can have at it. Or, alternatively, we could start a separate thread here, or as a third alternative, we could engage the discussion at oxgoad. I really wouldn’t mind getting into a little more fine-tuning of my thinking in these areas. I have been attempting to derive my arguments from the Scriptures first, then come to conclusions afterwards. Of course, it is probably impossible to do this without prejudice, but that was what I was attempting to do, in any case.Don, you have misunderstood me. I have not yet had time to view your article series. It’s possible I’m in complete agreement, but I would expect not. I was only using your stand-alone quote from that one post as an example of a “second premise” — in the sense that you were assuming the truth of a premise that had not yet been expressed and didn’t seem to think anyone would question it. Clearly, it is a second premise in the sense that Dr. Bauder is using the term, since you applied “worldly” to the music of a particular event without plain-spoken Biblical evidence (whether such exists or not might be a great topic of discussion).
I support the idea of a seperate thread on defining “worldliness”. Might I suggest that since you have already written a series of articles, why not ask Aaron to post them? They might make a great discussion starter. The alternative of waiting for me to write one would interject a terrible delay. I already have one article in the works to send to SI, plus I have committed to finishing my first book by summer’s end.
So, it is a worthy discussion. Let’s start it. If you don’t want to ask Aaron to post your articles, I will be happy to launch the thread with a lead post somewhat shorter than article length, but sure to encapsulate the differences between myself and many others here on this vital issue.
[Steve Newman] Is that they are willing to take on the “second premise” and attempt to make applicaitons to culture. Even when you think they are wrong, at least you know there is a respect for the holiness of God and there is an attempt to make delineations between a Christian and what the Bible calls “the world”.I am in agreement here.
While I shudder at the mis-applications of Scripture and the elevation of fundamentalist traditions to near-doctrinal levels by some, I also am terrified by the indifferent attitudes of some at the opposite extreme of these matters. Draw what conclusions you will, grace notwithstanding: one of the things we can say with certainty about our Lord is that He is quite particular, rather than indifferent, when it comes to details.
[AndrewS] 2) Do any fundamentalists believe in sanctification any more? Isn’t the Holy Spirit conforming us to the image of Christ? Shouldn’t we keep our eyes on Christ and not the taboos of the world.I don’t think it’s possible to conform to the image of Christ without that having some impact on how relate to the world. To put it another way, to be like Christ where we live, we have to have our eyes on Him and our eyes on the world to see how one relates to the other.
[PhilK] I just listened to this a few weeks ago, so it’s content is fresh in my memory. It contains excellent biblically-based analysis that would shed much light on the recent posts here. Does anyone know if these sermons are available in printed form?I don’t think they have been transcribed. Maybe we could take up a collection and hire that out (we’d have to get Kevin’s permission).
I [URL=http://www.blumer.org/adam/ know a guy[/URL] who does a little transcribing.
About second premises…
In this case, second premises are the ideas about “life as we know it” that are necessary to reason from a biblical premise to an application. So the first premise is “all humans are sinners.” The second premise is outside the Bible in the sphere of life… “I am a human.” It’s necessary to reach the conclusion: “I am a sinner.”
The more controversial second premises are assertions about life where we live that are necessary to apply biblical principles to cultural matters such as dress and entertainment.
Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.
[Mike Durning]Ahh… Ok, I am often a little slow. But be assured, I take no offense, just suggesting that this is a discussion worth having.[Don Johnson] Mike, I think this would be a discussion worth having. I have been working on defining worldliness, worldly and godliness in a series of articles at oxgoad.ca and in a series of Bible studies at our church (they can be found at gbcvic.org with audio and pdfs of the outlines). It seems to me that you think I am not defining the terms biblically, is that correct? If not, why don’t you write a paper defining these terms biblically and have Aaron publish it here at SI. Then we can have at it. Or, alternatively, we could start a separate thread here, or as a third alternative, we could engage the discussion at oxgoad. I really wouldn’t mind getting into a little more fine-tuning of my thinking in these areas. I have been attempting to derive my arguments from the Scriptures first, then come to conclusions afterwards. Of course, it is probably impossible to do this without prejudice, but that was what I was attempting to do, in any case.Don, you have misunderstood me. I have not yet had time to view your article series. It’s possible I’m in complete agreement, but I would expect not. I was only using your stand-alone quote from that one post as an example of a “second premise” — in the sense that you were assuming the truth of a premise that had not yet been expressed and didn’t seem to think anyone would question it. Clearly, it is a second premise in the sense that Dr. Bauder is using the term, since you applied “worldly” to the music of a particular event without plain-spoken Biblical evidence (whether such exists or not might be a great topic of discussion).
[Mike Durning] I support the idea of a seperate thread on defining “worldliness”. Might I suggest that since you have already written a series of articles, why not ask Aaron to post them? They might make a great discussion starter. The alternative of waiting for me to write one would interject a terrible delay. I already have one article in the works to send to SI, plus I have committed to finishing my first book by summer’s end.Fair enough. I think I’ll correspond with Aaron about it, and probably need to really edit my material. Too verbose! On one’s own site it doesn’t matter, but I should imagine it needs some editing.
Maranatha!
Don Johnson
Jer 33.3
Jim Peet, nice try bringing in that quote from Phil Christensen, however, his attempt to show the folly of Garlock is terribly flawed. The positing of “Rice is white; Ralph is white; therefore Ralph is Rice does not follow Phil’s example of Frank’s Theorum. If it did you would have ended with white is white, not Ralph is Rice.
Sorry, no winner on that one, better luck next time.
Sorry, no winner on that one, better luck next time.
Jim Peet,
Another thought on Phil’s posting, in his desire to show the folly of Garlock’s “logic” he brings his own into question. One must ask the question concerning Phil’s attempt to show the flaw with his trying out Franks’ theorum on God’s attributes, is kindness changeable then? And if so, how does kindness change? While acts of kindness take on different forms yet kindness is kindness nonetheless. Wouldn’t kindness then indeed be unchangeable?
Again, nice attempt, Jim and Phil, but really Phil’s attempt just crumbles.
I know I have digressed a bit off topic but Jim did bring in Phil’s attempt at premises and how they can be all messed up. And in Phil’s attempt to show messed up premises he is guilty of messed up premises.
Another thought on Phil’s posting, in his desire to show the folly of Garlock’s “logic” he brings his own into question. One must ask the question concerning Phil’s attempt to show the flaw with his trying out Franks’ theorum on God’s attributes, is kindness changeable then? And if so, how does kindness change? While acts of kindness take on different forms yet kindness is kindness nonetheless. Wouldn’t kindness then indeed be unchangeable?
Again, nice attempt, Jim and Phil, but really Phil’s attempt just crumbles.
I know I have digressed a bit off topic but Jim did bring in Phil’s attempt at premises and how they can be all messed up. And in Phil’s attempt to show messed up premises he is guilty of messed up premises.
Actually Phil’s analysis is pretty accurate.
Garlock’s reasoning there (assuming Phil correctly interpreted Garlock’s argument) is this:
1) X is A
2) X is B
3) Therefore A is B
Phil’s first analogy follows the same pattern:
1) God is kind
2) God is unchangeable
3) Therefore kindness is unchangeable
It doesn’t really matter whether kindness is changeable. Phil’s point is that the reasoning is not valid. The fact that God is both kind and unchangeable proves nothing the relationship of kindness and unchangeability to each other.
In his second example, he does mess up the pattern and goes to…
1) X is A
2) Y is A
3) Therefore Y is X
1) Rice is white
2) Ralph is white.
3) Therefore, Ralph is rice
But though he messes up the pattern there, the original reasoning is still invalid. The fact that an entity has two qualities, does not prove that any of the two qualities possesses the other as a quality.
A couple of better analogies…
The dog is tired
The dog is black
:. tiredness is black
Jim is bald
Jim is smart
:. baldness is smart
Boys are energetic
Boys are dirty
:. energy is dirty
We could do this all day. The reasoning is not valid even though examples can be found (with difficulty) that arrive at true conclusions, such as…
Kindness is good
Kindness is helpful
:. Goodness is helpful
But invalid reasoning is invalid whether its conclusions are true or false because the reasoning does not support the conclusion. In the case of Garlock’s assertion that music is moral, he happens to be right (at least, if “moral” means “has moral significance” or something like that). The fact that his reasoning is invalid doesn’t disprove his conclusion. It just shows that that particular argument doesn’t support his conclusion. There may be others that do.
Garlock’s reasoning there (assuming Phil correctly interpreted Garlock’s argument) is this:
2) X is B
3) Therefore A is B
Phil’s first analogy follows the same pattern:
2) God is unchangeable
3) Therefore kindness is unchangeable
It doesn’t really matter whether kindness is changeable. Phil’s point is that the reasoning is not valid. The fact that God is both kind and unchangeable proves nothing the relationship of kindness and unchangeability to each other.
In his second example, he does mess up the pattern and goes to…
2) Y is A
3) Therefore Y is X
1) Rice is white
2) Ralph is white.
3) Therefore, Ralph is rice
But though he messes up the pattern there, the original reasoning is still invalid. The fact that an entity has two qualities, does not prove that any of the two qualities possesses the other as a quality.
A couple of better analogies…
The dog is black
:. tiredness is black
Jim is bald
Jim is smart
:. baldness is smart
Boys are energetic
Boys are dirty
:. energy is dirty
We could do this all day. The reasoning is not valid even though examples can be found (with difficulty) that arrive at true conclusions, such as…
Kindness is helpful
:. Goodness is helpful
But invalid reasoning is invalid whether its conclusions are true or false because the reasoning does not support the conclusion. In the case of Garlock’s assertion that music is moral, he happens to be right (at least, if “moral” means “has moral significance” or something like that). The fact that his reasoning is invalid doesn’t disprove his conclusion. It just shows that that particular argument doesn’t support his conclusion. There may be others that do.
Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.
[Aaron Blumer] Actually Phil’s analysis is pretty accurate.And for our purposes, Dr. Garlock was engaging in second premise argumentation, as Dr. Bauder has called it. “God is musical” is a pretty abstract statement — abstract enough that how it would interlink with a syllogism is up for grabs.
1) Would someone be so kind as to point me to a technical definition of second premise? It seems Dr. Bauder is making use of syllogism. Is the ‘second premise’, as he uses it, the same as the ‘minor premise’ of a syllogism.In a word: No.
The major premise is by definition the one containing the major term, which, again by definition, is the predicate of the conclusion.
The minor premise is the one containing the minor term, which is the subject of the conclusion.
The middle term is the one that appears in both premises but not the conclusion.
These definitions hold regardless of the order of the premises, although proper formation does put the major premise first. Bauder is using “second” or “outside” to mean the term which is extra-biblical in the argument, not it’s role in form of the syllogism. In both of his examples the second premise is actually the major one, since they introduce the predicate of the conclusion.
(Thank you, Martin Cothran) http://www.memoriapress.com/images/book_images/logic/traditional_logic_…
Isn’t the discussion of Dr Garlock’s “position” getting us a good deal off the topic, especially when we are getting it second hand through the writing of someone who may or may not be accurately reporting Dr. Garlock’s views? I do remember Dr. Garlock saying things that sound something like what is reported, but I’d like to see some actual quotes of Dr. Garlock rather than quotes of Phil, if you don’t mind! But be that as it may, I think discussing Dr. Garlock here is a bit of a rabbit trail.
Maranatha!
Don Johnson
Jer 33.3
Isn’t the discussion of Dr Garlock’s “position” getting us a good deal off the topicOff, maybe. A good deal off, not really.
Here’s some more from my pal Martin Cochran again:
Truth means the correspondence of a statement to reality. An argument is valid when its conclusion follows logically from its premises. The term soundness is used to indicate that all the premises in an argument are true and that the argument is valid.The critique of Garlock is pointing out an argument which has truth, but lacks validity, and is thus unsound.
An argument can contain true premises and still be invalid. Likewise, it can be perfectly valid (or logical, if you prefer) and contain false premises. But if an argument is sound, its premises must be true and it must be valid.
Traditional Logic, Book 1 p.3
Bauder is dealing with arguments which, although perfectly valid, contain one premise of which the truth is under question. This throws the soundness of the argument into question.
So they both fall under the general topic of validity, but offer different examples of unsound arguments.
I think the Garlock example is useful for talking about clear thinking from premises. I’m not sure any of the premises in that example would qualify for what Bauder means by “second premises,” though. That would come along later when you start evaluating musical elements or styles and forming premises about them.
I realize analyzing logic isn’t for everybody so if you find this tedious, do feel more than free to skip it, but we also need alot more folks in fundamentalism who do analyze reasoning and can help make the thinking involved in applying Scripture more clear.
Got this via PM
The reason the identity reasoning (“transitive property of equality”) doesn’t work here is that this is not strictly what’s going on. Rather, you have an entity, “God” who possesses a quality “musical” (whatever exactly that means). Then, in the second premise, you have the same entity possessing another quality, “moral.” Then the conclusion which tries to establish a relationship between the two qualities but changes the first quality into an entity “music’ (rather than “musical”), music is moral.
If the reasoning was truly identity based, each premise would have to work in both directions:
“God is musical” and “musical is God”
This clearly doesn’t make sense, so identity is not what’s meant. More precisely, it’s “God possesses the quality of musicality.”
This is also true of the second premise: “God is moral” is not an identity statement or we’d also be able to say “moral is God.” It’s kind of nonsense because we’re comparing nouns to adjectives. What he’s really saying is “God has the quality of morality.”
So put in proper terms, it’s easier to see that the logic is invalid:
A possesses the quality of B
A possesses the quality of C
:. B possesses the quality of C
My examples show that this is not valid. Validity would basically mean that the reasoning always produces a true conclusion. But in the case of the reasoning above, though we can think of examples where the conclusion is true, it never really follows from the premises.
FWIW, I do believe “music is moral.” Technically, I think I’d rather say it’s “creating, performing and listening to music” that is moral. What it’s being used for is just one of the ways the morality of it is shaped. I think a whole lot comes as well from what the music means, and that meaning occurs on many levels: what it means to the composer, what it means to the listener, what it means “objectively” (to God—and the angels, I suppose). All of these shape the morality of the acts of composing, performing, listening, etc.
That’s my view in a nutshell, but the “God is moral, God is musical ergo music is moral” argument is not a valid one to reach that conclusion.
I should add that for all I know, Phil has not correctly represented what Garlock is saying in the example. I haven’t read it and really have no idea. But if he is reasoning “God is moral, God is musical ergo music is moral,” the reasoning is not valid.
One more example to hopefully nail the point:
God is musical. God is vengeful. Therefore music is vengeful?
I realize analyzing logic isn’t for everybody so if you find this tedious, do feel more than free to skip it, but we also need alot more folks in fundamentalism who do analyze reasoning and can help make the thinking involved in applying Scripture more clear.
Got this via PM
[anon] Aaron,My response…
Logic is not my field (church music is) … but I don’t agree with you that Christensen’s reasoning is correct. Also, he doesn’t seem to be representing Garlock’s argument fairly. (For the first example, isn’t there a sense in which the nature of divine kindness doesn’t change anyway? Even the absurdity of that depends on the definition of terms.)
The geometry/logic argument the “transitive property of equality”?
If a = b and b = c, then a = c.
So Garlock’s argument (charitably stated) would need to go in this order:
[A = B] 1. Music (A) is always associated with (=) the nature of God (B) (Instead of “God is musical”)
[B = C] 2. The nature of God (B) is always associated with (=) morality (C) (Instead of “God is moral”)
[A = C] 3. Therefore, music (A) is always associated with (=) morality (C)
I am assuming the second row. For the first, isn’t there a sense that everything is always associated with the nature of God? Saying that there’s any choice a human can make that has nothing to do with the nature of God (my definition of amoral), it seems to me, flies in the face of 1 Cor. 10:31. Every choice is either moral or [im] moral, by that standard.
Like language, food, or fire, the fact that God created music doesn’t keep man from messing things up, does it? This might be termed the musical effects of the Fall. I’m young, but I’ve often heard the amorality argument as something like “Morality lies not the music itself but in what it’s being used for.” … if you accept the A = B, then you can’t call music completely a-moral. (The color of your shirt isn’t completely amoral either, if my reasoning for A = B is correct)
The reason the identity reasoning (“transitive property of equality”) doesn’t work here is that this is not strictly what’s going on. Rather, you have an entity, “God” who possesses a quality “musical” (whatever exactly that means). Then, in the second premise, you have the same entity possessing another quality, “moral.” Then the conclusion which tries to establish a relationship between the two qualities but changes the first quality into an entity “music’ (rather than “musical”), music is moral.
If the reasoning was truly identity based, each premise would have to work in both directions:
“God is musical” and “musical is God”
This clearly doesn’t make sense, so identity is not what’s meant. More precisely, it’s “God possesses the quality of musicality.”
This is also true of the second premise: “God is moral” is not an identity statement or we’d also be able to say “moral is God.” It’s kind of nonsense because we’re comparing nouns to adjectives. What he’s really saying is “God has the quality of morality.”
So put in proper terms, it’s easier to see that the logic is invalid:
A possesses the quality of C
:. B possesses the quality of C
My examples show that this is not valid. Validity would basically mean that the reasoning always produces a true conclusion. But in the case of the reasoning above, though we can think of examples where the conclusion is true, it never really follows from the premises.
FWIW, I do believe “music is moral.” Technically, I think I’d rather say it’s “creating, performing and listening to music” that is moral. What it’s being used for is just one of the ways the morality of it is shaped. I think a whole lot comes as well from what the music means, and that meaning occurs on many levels: what it means to the composer, what it means to the listener, what it means “objectively” (to God—and the angels, I suppose). All of these shape the morality of the acts of composing, performing, listening, etc.
That’s my view in a nutshell, but the “God is moral, God is musical ergo music is moral” argument is not a valid one to reach that conclusion.
I should add that for all I know, Phil has not correctly represented what Garlock is saying in the example. I haven’t read it and really have no idea. But if he is reasoning “God is moral, God is musical ergo music is moral,” the reasoning is not valid.
One more example to hopefully nail the point:
God is musical. God is vengeful. Therefore music is vengeful?
Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.
[Audrey Cahilly] In both of his examples the second premise is actually the major one, since they introduce the predicate of the conclusion.Thanks Audrey. So does this make the Scripture the minor premise?
(Please excuse my ignorance - I’ve learned how ignorant I am of logic when I’ve dealt with Roman Catholics. They tend to derive much of their theology and tradition from logic, also.)
I remember when we used to refer to an application of Scripture, now we are going to create a theology based on Scripture as a second premise? Doesn’t sound quite right to me, somehow, but I’m not smart enough to explain why.
Andrew,
A thing Christians should not engage in (major term) is enslaving behavior (middle term).
This Biblical principle, because it contains the major term, is the major premise.
One enslaving behavior (middle term) is recreational heroin use (minor term).
This second, or extra-biblical premise, because it contains the minor term, is the minor premise
Recreational heroin use (subject-minor term) is a thing Christians should not engage in (predicate-major term).
The conclusion is what defines the major and minor terms.
There’s oodles of logic programs available. It’s worth getting one and working through it so you can say, “Hey, waaaaait a minute, there…” instead of getting snookered.
So does this make the Scripture the minor premise?In these examples, yes, but only because of the way the sentences were crafted. Formal logic deals with the form of an argument, not it’s content. The Biblical principle can be made the major premise (and everyone will feel better) by flipping the conclusion around. If you then put it all into what logicians recognize as “proper format” you get three terms linked to each other by the word “is” in two premises and a conclusion:
A thing Christians should not engage in (major term) is enslaving behavior (middle term).
This Biblical principle, because it contains the major term, is the major premise.
One enslaving behavior (middle term) is recreational heroin use (minor term).
This second, or extra-biblical premise, because it contains the minor term, is the minor premise
Recreational heroin use (subject-minor term) is a thing Christians should not engage in (predicate-major term).
The conclusion is what defines the major and minor terms.
There’s oodles of logic programs available. It’s worth getting one and working through it so you can say, “Hey, waaaaait a minute, there…” instead of getting snookered.
Leaving aside the syllogistic part, may I make a tentative observation?
I would suggest that in most cases, the presence of a second premise beyond the plain teaching of Scripture ought to do a few things to how we preach/teach a conviction:
1). It ought to raise our awareness that we are dealing with application, not interpretation on the issue.
2). It ought to cause us to carefully present the fact that the second premise is there in our application. This is not necessarily to give people in the congregation/class an escape clause from our conclusion, but to teach them the interpretation/application distinction more plainly.
3). It ought to cause us to present the conclusions of second premise applications with a little more tentativeness, rather than with the same force as doctrinal observations.
4). It ought to cause us to clearly define that any rules our church/institution may have based on such are functional for our own ministry; other believers who do not live by the same conclusions may not necessarily be out of fellowship with the Lord.
Agree / Disagree?
90% of my personal problem with some factions in Fundamentalism resides in a failure to do these things.
I would suggest that in most cases, the presence of a second premise beyond the plain teaching of Scripture ought to do a few things to how we preach/teach a conviction:
1). It ought to raise our awareness that we are dealing with application, not interpretation on the issue.
2). It ought to cause us to carefully present the fact that the second premise is there in our application. This is not necessarily to give people in the congregation/class an escape clause from our conclusion, but to teach them the interpretation/application distinction more plainly.
3). It ought to cause us to present the conclusions of second premise applications with a little more tentativeness, rather than with the same force as doctrinal observations.
4). It ought to cause us to clearly define that any rules our church/institution may have based on such are functional for our own ministry; other believers who do not live by the same conclusions may not necessarily be out of fellowship with the Lord.
Agree / Disagree?
90% of my personal problem with some factions in Fundamentalism resides in a failure to do these things.
On your point 4, Mike, I would object to the word “any” and “functional” if by “functional” you mean purely functional.
Further, I think that I object to the word “rules”. I can’t think of many rules we have in our church, mostly we try to teach principles and call people to make biblical applications themselves. We will help them make applications when they are struggling.
But I do agree that the tendency to elevate our applications to the level of Scripture is a big problem.
It ought to cause us to clearly define that any rules our church/institution may have based on such are functional for our own ministry; other believers who do not live by the same conclusions may not necessarily be out of fellowship with the Lord.Some second premise applications could include prohibitions against drugs, for example. I wouldn’t say these rules are purely functional. I would discipline a member out of the church if they defiantly persisted in ignoring such rules, wouldn’t you?
Further, I think that I object to the word “rules”. I can’t think of many rules we have in our church, mostly we try to teach principles and call people to make biblical applications themselves. We will help them make applications when they are struggling.
But I do agree that the tendency to elevate our applications to the level of Scripture is a big problem.
Maranatha!
Don Johnson
Jer 33.3
Don,
Sounds like your church runs a lot like mine. We are in agreement.
I was thinking more of things like music rules, which may work well in one church, but could easily cause one church’s members to look down on other ministries with different rules. And no, I’m not baiting you because of the “Resolved” thing. Just thinking.
Mike D
Sounds like your church runs a lot like mine. We are in agreement.
[Don Johnson] Some second premise applications could include prohibitions against drugs, for example. I wouldn’t say these rules are purely functional. I would discipline a member out of the church if they defiantly persisted in ignoring such rules, wouldn’t you?Surely — a logical extension of the drunkeness principle. Perhaps not even a second premise, since the word “drunkeness” had no chemistry knowledge behind it in Biblical times. I’ll have to think about that.
I was thinking more of things like music rules, which may work well in one church, but could easily cause one church’s members to look down on other ministries with different rules. And no, I’m not baiting you because of the “Resolved” thing. Just thinking.
Mike D
Agreement is breaking out all over. I agree that the music choices are certainly less clear cut and harder to make strong binding applications that would cause us to condemn someone who applies them differently than we do. With music as the example though, if another church came at the issue from an entirely different foundation (i.e., music is amoral), the divide would be too much for us to have meaningful fellowship as churches. I have friends who apply their musical choices differently than me (both stricter and less strict) but we all generally share the same understanding based on Biblical principles that there is such a thing as a moral question in music choices. Though our applications differ, we are not essentially divided.
Does that make sense?
Does that make sense?
Maranatha!
Don Johnson
Jer 33.3
[Don Johnson] Agreement is breaking out all over. I agree that the music choices are certainly less clear cut and harder to make strong binding applications that would cause us to condemn someone who applies them differently than we do. With music as the example though, if another church came at the issue from an entirely different foundation (i.e., music is amoral), the divide would be too much for us to have meaningful fellowship as churches. I have friends who apply their musical choices differently than me (both stricter and less strict) but we all generally share the same understanding based on Biblical principles that there is such a thing as a moral question in music choices. Though our applications differ, we are not essentially divided.Well, my church could hardly be called “trendy”, and we certainly aren’t early adapters on any band-wagons. But you stir an ugly pot when you bring up the morality/amorality of music issue.
Does that make sense?
Are you comfortable with this? Music (leaving aside lyrics) is amoral, but it has a cultural context that possesses a moral message and content within that particular culture. In other words, I deny that Rock is inherently rebellious or sinful, but I affirm that the message sent by it in the cultural context of the 50’s and beyond was association with an immoral and rebellious sub-culture. As time passes, that association fades. Thus what was inappropriate for worship at that time eventually becomes possibly appropriate (decisions as to when may vary from church to church depending on a variety of factors).
Are you comfortable with this? Music (leaving aside lyrics) is amoral, but it has a cultural context that possesses a moral message and content within that particular culture. In other words, I deny that Rock is inherently rebellious or sinful, but I affirm that the message sent by it in the cultural context of the 50’s and beyond was association with an immoral and rebellious sub-culture. As time passes, that association fades. Thus what was inappropriate for worship at that time eventually becomes possibly appropriate (decisions as to when may vary from church to church depending on a variety of factors).I can almost agree with this, myself. Just a couple of tweaks. Since music is always in a cultural context, there is no point in saying it is (sans words) amoral. What you’re saying is that it has morality that changes based on its meaning in a cultural setting.
I would agree with that, but I believe it also derives morality from many other factors such as the intentions/attitudes of the performer/listener, the effect on listeners/performers, etc. But these factors don’t necessarily correlate to style much. Nevertheless they are reasons why it’s impossible for music to be created, performed or listened to in an amoral way.
My other tweak would be to italicize and double underline “possibly” in “becomes possibly appropriate.” There’s lots of music I think is not sinful at all as a matter of morality, but which will never be suitable for worship because it’s whimsical, structured in a way that can’t support a text, etc. So “morality in general” and “morality for worship” are not precisely the same thing.
Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.
Well, we may have to part company on this point. We’ll see.
Would you say that it is possible for literature to be immoral? How about painting? Sculpture?
Why is it, of all the arts, music is the only one that is amoral?
But that debate can embroil us in a long argument. My two questions above should explain my position sufficiently.
I said earlier that a difference here would bring about divisions. I think that it is possible that one could hold a view that music is amoral yet still use music that would fall into a range that I would consider basically moral. If that were the case no division would likely arise at that point in time. But someone who holds that music is amoral will likely end up making musical choices (or allowances) that would put them in a category I wouldn’t want our people to emulate, so a division would occur. Not necessarily an anathema, but at least a division.
PS, in response to Aaron, I wouldn’t say that the morality or acceptability of music is exclusively driven by culture. I agree that we are always in a cultural context, hence connotation can make music morally unacceptable. But I would hold that an unacceptable denotation is also possible (and quite prevalent).
Would you say that it is possible for literature to be immoral? How about painting? Sculpture?
Why is it, of all the arts, music is the only one that is amoral?
But that debate can embroil us in a long argument. My two questions above should explain my position sufficiently.
I said earlier that a difference here would bring about divisions. I think that it is possible that one could hold a view that music is amoral yet still use music that would fall into a range that I would consider basically moral. If that were the case no division would likely arise at that point in time. But someone who holds that music is amoral will likely end up making musical choices (or allowances) that would put them in a category I wouldn’t want our people to emulate, so a division would occur. Not necessarily an anathema, but at least a division.
PS, in response to Aaron, I wouldn’t say that the morality or acceptability of music is exclusively driven by culture. I agree that we are always in a cultural context, hence connotation can make music morally unacceptable. But I would hold that an unacceptable denotation is also possible (and quite prevalent).
Maranatha!
Don Johnson
Jer 33.3
I have heard that argument, Don… that all the arts are amoral.
But again, many erase the amorality when they start qualifying it. What some mean is that the substance called paint adhering to a surface we call canvas is amoral. Probably so, like a chord is amoral. But these things never exist independently of a human being arranging the paint on the surface with some kind of intention or arranging the chord in a musical composition… again with purpose. (OK it is possible for pain to get on canvas as a result of an explosion in a paint factory… presto, amoral paintings!)
So “amorality” that is confined to physical/auditory objects isolated from their makers or any other interaction is not amorality at all in any meaningful sense. There’s no point in bothering w/the category. If one allows that intention, effect, connotation, denotation, etc. all contribute to moral significance, there is no point in asserting isolated amorality at all. Since the conditions required for the amorality never exist, the proposed amorality cannot be used in support of any argument that a particular style of music doesn’t matter or that all styles don’t matter, etc. That’s already been ruled out if one allows that music (sans words) has meaning, motive and impact whenever human beings produce it or take it in.
But again, many erase the amorality when they start qualifying it. What some mean is that the substance called paint adhering to a surface we call canvas is amoral. Probably so, like a chord is amoral. But these things never exist independently of a human being arranging the paint on the surface with some kind of intention or arranging the chord in a musical composition… again with purpose. (OK it is possible for pain to get on canvas as a result of an explosion in a paint factory… presto, amoral paintings!)
So “amorality” that is confined to physical/auditory objects isolated from their makers or any other interaction is not amorality at all in any meaningful sense. There’s no point in bothering w/the category. If one allows that intention, effect, connotation, denotation, etc. all contribute to moral significance, there is no point in asserting isolated amorality at all. Since the conditions required for the amorality never exist, the proposed amorality cannot be used in support of any argument that a particular style of music doesn’t matter or that all styles don’t matter, etc. That’s already been ruled out if one allows that music (sans words) has meaning, motive and impact whenever human beings produce it or take it in.
Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.
Well, I’ll try to comment once more and then shut up, lest this thread morph into yet another music thread. [Why does it seem that all threads, left untended, morph into music threads? It’s kind of weird.]
Aaron, I accept your qualifications of my statement, and agree largely with your further comments afterward.
What some do with music would be the same as if they said, about painting, “Impressionism is of the Devil”. [Which might then lead to “Since they allowed Impressionism in the school art rooms, teen pregnancy has gone up.”]
However, the communicated content of a painting (or a song, lyrically) can be immoral. Or the philosophy behind a genre can be godless. But that’s not the same thing at all.
Aaron hints at an important point too.
Moral qualities are not possessed by objects, whether concrete (like a painting) or abstract. The ink on “Playboy” is not manufactured in hell (though it may as well have been). But materially, it is not different than the ink in “Scientific American”. What is communicated, however, can and does possess moral tone.
I do feel that what happens with regard to rock music in, for instance, a Frank Garlock seminar*, would be like lifting up Pornographic magazines as an example, and thus preaching against all magazines.
Frankly (pun intended), I don’t even think Frank Garlock* believes his own message. If so, he wouldn’t play samples in his seminars. Just as I don’t kill people during my sermon to demonstrate that murder is wrong.
*disclaimer: I know nothing about Frank Garlock seminars since I last heard one in the late ‘70’s.
Aaron, I accept your qualifications of my statement, and agree largely with your further comments afterward.
[Don Johnson] Well, we may have to part company on this point. We’ll see.Don, I don’t believe the things themselves, either in genre or style, possess any moral qualities. I believe this is also true of painting or sculpture.
Would you say that it is possible for literature to be immoral? How about painting? Sculpture?
Why is it, of all the arts, music is the only one that is amoral?
What some do with music would be the same as if they said, about painting, “Impressionism is of the Devil”. [Which might then lead to “Since they allowed Impressionism in the school art rooms, teen pregnancy has gone up.”]
However, the communicated content of a painting (or a song, lyrically) can be immoral. Or the philosophy behind a genre can be godless. But that’s not the same thing at all.
Aaron hints at an important point too.
Moral qualities are not possessed by objects, whether concrete (like a painting) or abstract. The ink on “Playboy” is not manufactured in hell (though it may as well have been). But materially, it is not different than the ink in “Scientific American”. What is communicated, however, can and does possess moral tone.
I do feel that what happens with regard to rock music in, for instance, a Frank Garlock seminar*, would be like lifting up Pornographic magazines as an example, and thus preaching against all magazines.
Frankly (pun intended), I don’t even think Frank Garlock* believes his own message. If so, he wouldn’t play samples in his seminars. Just as I don’t kill people during my sermon to demonstrate that murder is wrong.
*disclaimer: I know nothing about Frank Garlock seminars since I last heard one in the late ‘70’s.
There has to be meaning that is *understood* by the listener, viewer or reader of art for there to be any moral component present. To use Aaron’s example of an explosion in an art factory, there is much abstract art that doesn’t look too different from his description. If the viewer doesn’t understand what is being depicted, it can’t possibly have any moral meaning to him. The morality comes from the heart of man — how the art is understood and processed by a human gives rise to whatever moral component is there. I don’t believe the “object” can possess it at all. The same would be true with literature. I have to understand what is there for it to have any moral effect on me. Even if the literature is in English, if the author is using figures I don’t understand or have no familiarity with to portray something immoral, I could read it without any adverse moral effect. We’ve all heard examples about the bunny symbol that can indicate something immoral to those who know what it means, and has no meaning to those who don’t.
Music is much more abstract than either painting (excepting completely abstract art) or literature. Take pretty much any piece (music only) and have two people with different life experiences listen to it, and they often come away with completely different reactions. Just the difference I see when my wife and I listen to Bach (I love his music, she hates pretty much all of it) indicate to me that the meaning is in how it is perceived and understood, not the music itself. When I listen to it and get an “emotional high,” but at the same time my wife is getting on edge, and irritable from the same music, any so-called inherent value is lost in the perception.
I agree with Aaron that music doesn’t exist in a complete vacuum. There is the act of creation, the act of performance, and the act of listening, all done by humans who attempt to infuse what they are doing with meaning, and that meaning can certainly have a moral component. But that’s exactly why I don’t believe that music is *inherently* moral in nature. Even Aaron stating that chord is amoral is simply an assertion. Why is a chord not moral, but a musical phrase is? How is that measured objectively? Theoretically, if music actually has inherent moral meaning, we should be able to calculate that, and feed sheet music into a computer which can analyze all the notes, chords, phrases, harmonies, etc., and spit out the exact moral value of the music. The fact we can’t do that indicates to me that any moral effect of music takes place in our hearts (which we already know are immoral by nature), not in the music itself.
This is why I not only don’t believe in the “inherent morality” of music, I think it’s actually useless for any true evaluation, and further, I don’t believe that anyone evaluating music is actually evaluating the inherent morality. They are evaluating how it makes them feel, whether or not such feelings are appropriate for what the music would be used for, and they are also evaluating the association of the music, how it used for various things, or to attempt to cause certain emotions (even though that’s very inexact), etc. The difference is that I accept that that’s how music is evaluated, while many still resort to the assertion that “Music is MORAL — it HAS to be!” thought, and then still evaluate on other grounds anyway.
Even though my standards for example, on what would be used in church, are probably very similar to Don’s (in fact, from what I read, they would be pretty close to Scott Aniol’s), my way of getting there is different, and more like Mike Durning’s.
Edit: Mike, I see we posted similar thoughts at about the same time. It took a while to compose my message, so I didn’t see yours until afterward.
Music is much more abstract than either painting (excepting completely abstract art) or literature. Take pretty much any piece (music only) and have two people with different life experiences listen to it, and they often come away with completely different reactions. Just the difference I see when my wife and I listen to Bach (I love his music, she hates pretty much all of it) indicate to me that the meaning is in how it is perceived and understood, not the music itself. When I listen to it and get an “emotional high,” but at the same time my wife is getting on edge, and irritable from the same music, any so-called inherent value is lost in the perception.
I agree with Aaron that music doesn’t exist in a complete vacuum. There is the act of creation, the act of performance, and the act of listening, all done by humans who attempt to infuse what they are doing with meaning, and that meaning can certainly have a moral component. But that’s exactly why I don’t believe that music is *inherently* moral in nature. Even Aaron stating that chord is amoral is simply an assertion. Why is a chord not moral, but a musical phrase is? How is that measured objectively? Theoretically, if music actually has inherent moral meaning, we should be able to calculate that, and feed sheet music into a computer which can analyze all the notes, chords, phrases, harmonies, etc., and spit out the exact moral value of the music. The fact we can’t do that indicates to me that any moral effect of music takes place in our hearts (which we already know are immoral by nature), not in the music itself.
This is why I not only don’t believe in the “inherent morality” of music, I think it’s actually useless for any true evaluation, and further, I don’t believe that anyone evaluating music is actually evaluating the inherent morality. They are evaluating how it makes them feel, whether or not such feelings are appropriate for what the music would be used for, and they are also evaluating the association of the music, how it used for various things, or to attempt to cause certain emotions (even though that’s very inexact), etc. The difference is that I accept that that’s how music is evaluated, while many still resort to the assertion that “Music is MORAL — it HAS to be!” thought, and then still evaluate on other grounds anyway.
Even though my standards for example, on what would be used in church, are probably very similar to Don’s (in fact, from what I read, they would be pretty close to Scott Aniol’s), my way of getting there is different, and more like Mike Durning’s.
Edit: Mike, I see we posted similar thoughts at about the same time. It took a while to compose my message, so I didn’t see yours until afterward.
Dave Barnhart
Interesting series.
1. In Part 6 looks at “standards” of conduct.
I think that “standards” was a good choice of words. A “standard” is different from a “conviction” in that a standard refers to a community determined and demanded behavior pattern.
There is a desperate need to allow for convictions without all convictions being made into standards. This is Fundamentalism’s major practical flaw. If a behavior is believed to be taboo, it is made a “standard” (by the church or the pastor, if Patton is in charge). If it does not reach that level, it tends to be not viewed as even eligible for “conviction.”
2. In Part 7, the important second premise is discussed.
Giving this as an example of a second premise is legitimate:
I think that there are at least two areas in which we should consider second premises:
1. Some things exhibit a forbidden quality per se. Bauder’s example, “Bikinis are immodest,” probably fits in this category.
2. Others exhibit the forbidden quality only by means of a sign. If prostitutes always wore a red sweater, then red sweaters might legitimately become a provocative sign, and thus a second premise could legitimately be that “Red sweaters are provocative and sexually suggestive.”
1. In Part 6 looks at “standards” of conduct.
I think that “standards” was a good choice of words. A “standard” is different from a “conviction” in that a standard refers to a community determined and demanded behavior pattern.
There is a desperate need to allow for convictions without all convictions being made into standards. This is Fundamentalism’s major practical flaw. If a behavior is believed to be taboo, it is made a “standard” (by the church or the pastor, if Patton is in charge). If it does not reach that level, it tends to be not viewed as even eligible for “conviction.”
2. In Part 7, the important second premise is discussed.
Giving this as an example of a second premise is legitimate:
[Article] Biblical principle: God commands all humans everywhere to repent (Acts 17:30).But it seems to present something other than the paper is about. The types of syllogisms we should expect to find disagreement over are nothing as tautological as this. It seems like for some speakers the message might be, “Yes, we need data found outside Scripture. But it’s all cut and dried. Listen to me for a while and I’ll prove all my standards. You know you’re human, right? It’s like more of that type of thing.”
Outside premise: I am a human.
Conclusion: God commands me to repent.
I think that there are at least two areas in which we should consider second premises:
1. Some things exhibit a forbidden quality per se. Bauder’s example, “Bikinis are immodest,” probably fits in this category.
2. Others exhibit the forbidden quality only by means of a sign. If prostitutes always wore a red sweater, then red sweaters might legitimately become a provocative sign, and thus a second premise could legitimately be that “Red sweaters are provocative and sexually suggestive.”
[Dan Miller]Something similar actually happened in our area last year. There was an article in the paper about how prostitutes downtown, in an effort to avoid police, started using modest “girl next door” looks, but with specific combinations of colors, accessories, etc., that those who were “in the know” would be able to look for. The article didn’t detail the looks, probably because they would just be switched out if they did, so it would not have been that easy to create a hard and fast second premise. But you would generally expect that any Christian girls that did know “the look” would want to avoid it for obvious reasons, even if was otherwise modest and attractive.
2. Others exhibit the forbidden quality only by means of a sign. If prostitutes always wore a red sweater, then red sweaters might legitimately become a provocative sign, and thus a second premise could legitimately be that “Red sweaters are provocative and sexually suggestive.”
Dave Barnhart
Let me try again, stating my questions a different way. The argument that paint, ink, chords, and other raw materials of artistic expression are amoral is just sophistry. These things by themselves aren’t art. If they are, I have a lot of art sitting unused in paint cans in my storage shelves.
The point under debate is the artistic expression itself. To express something, it has to mean something, no?
So let me ask this, do you believe there is such a thing as ‘dirty’ painting? Or ‘dirty’ books? Or ‘dirty’ sculpture?
But then, you are asserting, there is no such thing as ‘dirty’ music in and of itself?
BTW, I will concede that music is much more abstract than other forms of art and meaning is much more difficult to discern in some cases.
~~~~
I think Dan’s two points are correct, and speak to denotation and connotation. Some things are wrong because of what they denote (inherent meaning). Other things are wrong because of what they connote (cultural context).
The point under debate is the artistic expression itself. To express something, it has to mean something, no?
So let me ask this, do you believe there is such a thing as ‘dirty’ painting? Or ‘dirty’ books? Or ‘dirty’ sculpture?
But then, you are asserting, there is no such thing as ‘dirty’ music in and of itself?
BTW, I will concede that music is much more abstract than other forms of art and meaning is much more difficult to discern in some cases.
~~~~
I think Dan’s two points are correct, and speak to denotation and connotation. Some things are wrong because of what they denote (inherent meaning). Other things are wrong because of what they connote (cultural context).
Maranatha!
Don Johnson
Jer 33.3
[Aaron Blumer] I have heard that argument, Don… that all the arts are amoral.Probably the closest thing to amoral paintings are the ones that elephants at the Wichita Zoo do.
But again, many erase the amorality when they start qualifying it. What some mean is that the substance called paint adhering to a surface we call canvas is amoral. Probably so, like a chord is amoral. But these things never exist independently of a human being arranging the paint on the surface with some kind of intention or arranging the chord in a musical composition… again with purpose. (OK it is possible for pain to get on canvas as a result of an explosion in a paint factory… presto, amoral paintings!)
[Don Johnson]Agreed, though the attempt is not always successful. I’m a big listener of classical music. If I hear after a piece that was played that a piece was intended, for example, to express something and I didn’t get that at all, then it didn’t really matter at the moment I heard it what the artist’s intention was, does it? If I would later find out that he intended to express something immoral, I would then make that *association* in the future, and it would then be difficult for me to listen with a clear conscience. The same would apply to abstract art or non-literal writing.
The point under debate is the artistic expression itself. To express something, it has to mean something, no?
As an example, if music is so inherently meaningful, why is it not immediately a form of “cognitive dissonance” when Disney animators take a piece like “The Pines of Rome,” and use it for “Flying Whales?”
So let me ask this, do you believe there is such a thing as ‘dirty’ painting? Or ‘dirty’ books? Or ‘dirty’ sculpture?No, I don’t. You may think that sounds crazy, but let’s say I had a book passed down to me I had never had a chance to read, so I didn’t know it expressed something immoral. Before I read it, did it “dirty” my shelf or my home any more than any other book I have? What if I did read it, but didn’t understand any euphemisms the author was using to refer to something immoral? The dirty part would only come when my heart interacts with what is there, and it would be the imaginations of my heart that would make it so. The Lord said clearly it’s what comes *out* of the man that defiles him. The same would be true of a painting in a package I had never opened. The painting itself is not dirty. Let me ask this — would Adam or Eve before the fall have sinned by viewing an immoral statue placed in the Garden by Satan, assuming God had told them nothing of it? I can’t say with authority, but I would argue that no, they would not have — Satan attacked them using the one thing God had forbidden to them. That statue would not have been dirty to them. It’s simply an object.
Obviously, because of what such objects or books would cause my heart to think, feel, etc., I would not keep such things around, but it’s not because I believe the object itself is dirty — it is our fallen nature that causes dirtiness, and the same reason that Adam and Eve had to cover themselves after the fall. There is nothing dirty about any part of the human anatomy. After all, God created it. But our fallen minds and hearts are certainly tempted if modesty is not exercised.
But then, you are asserting, there is no such thing as ‘dirty’ music in and of itself?Yes, that’s exactly what I’m saying. If you want to say otherwise, show me how to evaluate its moral value using the inherent value of the music itself, not association, appropriateness, the lifestyle of the composer, etc. (all valid forms of evaluation, but not applicable to inherent value).
Let me ask you a question. When you evaluate music for your church, do you attempt to sit down with every piece and identify musical elements and say “OK, that chord pattern is immoral,” or “that tune is evil?” If not, how do you do the evaluation? More importantly, can you do it (leaving words out of the picture) without listening to it? (Or, if you are very musically inclined, attempting to imagine how it sounds from the notes on the page)?
BTW, I will concede that music is much more abstract than other forms of art and meaning is much more difficult to discern in some cases.I would be ecstatic if you showed me how to identify this *inherent* meaning, rather than it’s association, or what the author *intended* it to mean (which is not the same as saying the music actually inherently means that).
I think Dan’s two points are correct, and speak to denotation and connotation. Some things are wrong because of what they denote (inherent meaning). Other things are wrong because of what they connote (cultural context).I don’t disagree exactly, but I don’t believe music (apart from words) has a denotative meaning, because although it’s been asserted over and over by secular and Christian people alike, I don’t believe it’s been demonstrated. Further, I believe the Bible says exactly the opposite. It’s our evil hearts that defile us, not what goes in. With cultural context, we’re on the same page. The world’s music is associated with the world, which is obviously attempting to express its opposition to God and his order. But I’ll bet that was true 500 years ago too, and I’ve yet to have anyone show me any instrumental music from 500 years ago and claim that it’s inherently immoral, let alone demonstrate why that is so.
Dave Barnhart
[dcbii]Your shelf or home are non-moral objects. They can’t be ‘dirtied’. You, on the other hand are a moral being and your conscience can be sullied or edified by its interaction with objects of art, as you note yourself. But it isn’t merely the corruption of your own heart that makes the object dirty, the corruption of the artist’s heart is involved as well.[Don Johnson] So let me ask this, do you believe there is such a thing as ‘dirty’ painting? Or ‘dirty’ books? Or ‘dirty’ sculpture?No, I don’t. You may think that sounds crazy, but let’s say I had a book passed down to me I had never had a chance to read, so I didn’t know it expressed something immoral. Before I read it, did it “dirty” my shelf or my home any more than any other book I have? What if I did read it, but didn’t understand any euphemisms the author was using to refer to something immoral? The dirty part would only come when my heart interacts with what is there, and it would be the imaginations of my heart that would make it so.
[dcbii] The Lord said clearly it’s what comes *out* of the man that defiles him.You are misusing this passage. The Lord was talking about food coming into a man not being able to defile a man. He wasn’t evaluating our conscience being engaged with the moral expression of someone else, be it literature or music or what have you.
[dcbii] Let me ask this — would Adam or Eve before the fall have sinned by viewing an immoral statue placed in the Garden by Satan, assuming God had told them nothing of it? I can’t say with authority, but I would argue that no, they would not have — Satan attacked them using the one thing God had forbidden to them. That statue would not have been dirty to them. It’s simply an object.I would think this is totally irrelevant and doesn’t prove anything.
[dcbii]My answer here would not satisfy you! But it is mostly along the lines of “I know it when I see/hear it.” Since you won’t admit that a painting or book can be inherently dirty/evil, it is likely to be fruitless to ask, but at what point does such a work become ‘dirty’? But not admitting it, you can’t really answer the question. In fact, neither can I, with precision. Some literary works are entirely erotic, for example, but other works may allude to it in such a way that the reader knows what is going on but is spared the details. At what point does such literature become evil? Or perhaps not evil but too corrupt for Christian participation? Various Christians may answer the question various ways. But that doesn’t mean there is no such thing as corrupt or dirty works of literature.[Don Johnson] But then, you are asserting, there is no such thing as ‘dirty’ music in and of itself?Yes, that’s exactly what I’m saying. If you want to say otherwise, show me how to evaluate its moral value using the inherent value of the music itself, not association, appropriateness, the lifestyle of the composer, etc. (all valid forms of evaluation, but not applicable to inherent value).
Let me ask you a question. When you evaluate music for your church, do you attempt to sit down with every piece and identify musical elements and say “OK, that chord pattern is immoral,” or “that tune is evil?” If not, how do you do the evaluation? More importantly, can you do it (leaving words out of the picture) without listening to it? (Or, if you are very musically inclined, attempting to imagine how it sounds from the notes on the page)?
Well, I think that is enough for now. We’ll get ourselves far afield if we continue this line of conversation.
Maranatha!
Don Johnson
Jer 33.3
Just for fun (because I can’t imagine this thread is going anywhere useful), let’s examine a syllogistic fallacy in this thread.
Propositions, slightly altered to be syllogistically valid;
1) A painting is a thing that may be immoral.
2) A painting is a work of art.
3) A song is a work of art.
No matter how you move these propositions around, you would never be able to deduce the conclusion, “A song is a thing that may be immoral.” The conclusion may or may not be true, but you can never get there through the line of reasoning in Don’s posts. It’s the fallacy of the excluded middle. You would need a proposition to read thus: “All works of art are things that can be immoral,” which, unfortunately, is what the argument is currently attempting to prove.
To use another example, this line of reasoning is equivalent to asserting that whales are land animals because 1) they are mammals and 2) 99%+ of mammals are land animals.
Propositions, slightly altered to be syllogistically valid;
1) A painting is a thing that may be immoral.
2) A painting is a work of art.
3) A song is a work of art.
No matter how you move these propositions around, you would never be able to deduce the conclusion, “A song is a thing that may be immoral.” The conclusion may or may not be true, but you can never get there through the line of reasoning in Don’s posts. It’s the fallacy of the excluded middle. You would need a proposition to read thus: “All works of art are things that can be immoral,” which, unfortunately, is what the argument is currently attempting to prove.
To use another example, this line of reasoning is equivalent to asserting that whales are land animals because 1) they are mammals and 2) 99%+ of mammals are land animals.
My Blog: http://dearreaderblog.com
Cor meum tibi offero Domine prompte et sincere. ~ John Calvin
[Don Johnson]As I stated previously, I agree there is a moral *act* involved when art is created, performed, or heard/seen. I don’t disagree with you here. I just disagree that the object itself is what is dirty. Corrupt communication can come from an artist, and if understood when seen/heard/read can interact with our evil hearts to cause corruption. Simply hearing it or seeing it is not enough, of course, otherwise the Lord Jesus would have been sullied by nearly everything he saw or heard around him.
But it isn’t merely the corruption of your own heart that makes the object dirty, the corruption of the artist’s heart is involved as well.
You are misusing this passage. The Lord was talking about food coming into a man not being able to defile a man. He wasn’t evaluating our conscience being engaged with the moral expression of someone else, be it literature or music or what have you.I agree that what was going in was food, but in the next few verses, he describes what defiles us, and it’s all our thoughts and intents coming from within, not from without. Again, that makes complete sense to me, otherwise Jesus just being confronted with the evil of others could have been defiled. There was nothing in his heart that coming out, could have defiled him.
My answer here would not satisfy you! But it is mostly along the lines of “I know it when I see/hear it.”Exactly. It has to interact with your heart/mind for you to make a determination. This is exactly why eating meat could be sin to some and not to others (and I’m not just talking about food — I’m talking about conscience, as Paul did).
Since you won’t admit that a painting or book can be inherently dirty/evil, it is likely to be fruitless to ask, but at what point does such a work become ‘dirty’?I can’t answer the question in the way you would like, but I don’t believe the container becomes evil in itself. It simply an aid in transmitting an evil thought from the mind of its creator to the mind of the consumer. Like you, I certainly don’t want to interact with certain art or literature, because I’m not interested in affecting my heart and conscience with evil thoughts and ideas from their creators that are being put forward. Hence, I wouldn’t keep such things around. But when we destroy something like that, what we are really destroying is the idea, and the ability to get that to someone else — the thing itself is just a medium.
But that doesn’t mean there is no such thing as corrupt or dirty works of literature.We obviously would agree on what to do with such things, but I believe the source of the corruption (the author/creator) is what is evil, and not the object. In the case of music, unlike art or literature, I disagree that apart from knowing the intent of the composer (and sometimes not even then), that music can actually communicate propositional ideas to the hearer. What is communicated is impression at best (as with some art and literature), and completely colored and often overwhelmed or overshadowed by what the listener has previously experienced.
Calling a work or art or literature “dirty” is a convenient shorthand, and that’s why we use the expression. That doesn’t mean it’s necessarily an accurate portrayal of reality.
Well, I think that is enough for now. We’ll get ourselves far afield if we continue this line of conversation.True enough.
Dave Barnhart
At the risk of sounding like I agree with Don, :) I’d like to interact with some of Dave’s comments:
[quote dcbii] There has to be meaning that is *understood* by the listener, viewer or reader of art for there to be any moral component present. …The same would be true with literature. I have to understand what is there for it to have any moral effect on me.[quotedcbii] I disagree that apart from knowing the intent of the composer (and sometimes not even then), that music can actually communicate propositional ideas to the hearer.You seem to be stating that only intellectual interactions have moral implication; In order for something to affect me morally, I have to process it with my mind and understand what’s happening to me. I disagree. Music, like other art forms, has the ability to influence and even (to a degree) control us. However, music, unlike literature, can do that apart from cognitive interaction. For an erotic novel to affect me, I have to process the alphabetic symbols visually, assign meaning to those symbols, and translate that into images or concepts. Not so with music. Music has the unique ability to affect your body and emotions without you even being consciously aware of it. Advertisers, film makers, store and restaurant owners, etc. all make regular use of this power. To couch the discussion of morality in purely cognitive terms seems to deny the effects of the fall on the whole person.
[quote dcbii] Music is much more abstract than either painting (excepting completely abstract art) or literature.True. But it’s not simply that music is “more abstract” than literature; It is a different medium altogether, engaging a different part of the person. Music, unlike literature, can be experienced and even enjoyed while almost entirely bypassing any cognitive interaction. That has important moral implications.
[quote dcbii] Take pretty much any piece (music only) and have two people with different life experiences listen to it, and they often come away with completely different reactions.Granted (except I don’t know that I would say “often”). But your illustration about you and your wife listening to Bach is about levels of enjoyment, which is not the same as moral effect. There is an aspect to music’s effect on people that is learned, or acquired, via culture, life experience, education, etc. But that doesn’t negate the contrary fact that very often people from different life experiences and cultures will have very similar reactions (emotional and physical) to the same music. There is an aspect to music’s effect on the human that is essentially universal, regardless of culture. That has significant moral implications.
[quote dcbii] Why is a chord not moral, but a musical phrase is? For the same reason that the alphabet isn’t moral but sentences can be. (Or if you prefer, sentences can have moral effects on the reader.) I don’t know that I would say something as small as a musical phrase necessarily has moral implications, but certainly several phrases strung together, in a particular style, can.
[quote dcbii] How is that measured objectively? Theoretically, if music actually has inherent moral meaning, we should be able to calculate that, and feed sheet music into a computer which can analyze all the notes, chords, phrases, harmonies, etc., and spit out the exact moral value of the music. The fact we can’t do that indicates to me that any moral effect of music takes place in our hearts (which we already know are immoral by nature), not in the music itself.So, you’re saying that nothing has inherent moral meaning if it can’t be mathematically quantified by machine?! If all you’re arguing is something like “Playboy isn’t immoral. The person looking at it is.” Okay, fine. Inanimate objects are technically incapable of possessing morality. But when we speak of the” immorality” of pornography the obvious understanding is that someone is making it and someone else is looking at it. The same is true of music. Technically speaking, music is just sound waves, so obviously we’re talking about the process of human beings experiencing and interacting with it. When most people talk about the ‘morality of music’ I understand them to be speaking of it’s moral effect on people. We could ask: “If a rock song plays in the woods and no one hears it, is it immoral?” But that would obviously be a big waste of time. I’m not quite seeing the point or purpose of your particular philosophical argument. In my experience, those who say that “music is amoral” are arguing that music, apart from text and apart from associations, has no ability to affect the listener morally. That is untrue.
Getting back to the original post (what was it again?), denying the moral implications of music as sound is what leads to philosophies like http://www.worshipmatters.com/wp-content/uploads/Does-God-Even-Like-Our…] this :
[quote Bob Kauflin] Did you ever wonder — What kind of music does GOD like? He commands us to make music, so he must take pleasure in it. Does he like modern worship better than hymns? Rock better than country? Folk better than jazz? What if God’s favorite music is opera? The kind of music God likes isn’t determined by a style, genre, beat, or generation.
[quote dcbii] There has to be meaning that is *understood* by the listener, viewer or reader of art for there to be any moral component present. …The same would be true with literature. I have to understand what is there for it to have any moral effect on me.[quotedcbii] I disagree that apart from knowing the intent of the composer (and sometimes not even then), that music can actually communicate propositional ideas to the hearer.You seem to be stating that only intellectual interactions have moral implication; In order for something to affect me morally, I have to process it with my mind and understand what’s happening to me. I disagree. Music, like other art forms, has the ability to influence and even (to a degree) control us. However, music, unlike literature, can do that apart from cognitive interaction. For an erotic novel to affect me, I have to process the alphabetic symbols visually, assign meaning to those symbols, and translate that into images or concepts. Not so with music. Music has the unique ability to affect your body and emotions without you even being consciously aware of it. Advertisers, film makers, store and restaurant owners, etc. all make regular use of this power. To couch the discussion of morality in purely cognitive terms seems to deny the effects of the fall on the whole person.
[quote dcbii] Music is much more abstract than either painting (excepting completely abstract art) or literature.True. But it’s not simply that music is “more abstract” than literature; It is a different medium altogether, engaging a different part of the person. Music, unlike literature, can be experienced and even enjoyed while almost entirely bypassing any cognitive interaction. That has important moral implications.
[quote dcbii] Take pretty much any piece (music only) and have two people with different life experiences listen to it, and they often come away with completely different reactions.Granted (except I don’t know that I would say “often”). But your illustration about you and your wife listening to Bach is about levels of enjoyment, which is not the same as moral effect. There is an aspect to music’s effect on people that is learned, or acquired, via culture, life experience, education, etc. But that doesn’t negate the contrary fact that very often people from different life experiences and cultures will have very similar reactions (emotional and physical) to the same music. There is an aspect to music’s effect on the human that is essentially universal, regardless of culture. That has significant moral implications.
[quote dcbii] Why is a chord not moral, but a musical phrase is? For the same reason that the alphabet isn’t moral but sentences can be. (Or if you prefer, sentences can have moral effects on the reader.) I don’t know that I would say something as small as a musical phrase necessarily has moral implications, but certainly several phrases strung together, in a particular style, can.
[quote dcbii] How is that measured objectively? Theoretically, if music actually has inherent moral meaning, we should be able to calculate that, and feed sheet music into a computer which can analyze all the notes, chords, phrases, harmonies, etc., and spit out the exact moral value of the music. The fact we can’t do that indicates to me that any moral effect of music takes place in our hearts (which we already know are immoral by nature), not in the music itself.So, you’re saying that nothing has inherent moral meaning if it can’t be mathematically quantified by machine?! If all you’re arguing is something like “Playboy isn’t immoral. The person looking at it is.” Okay, fine. Inanimate objects are technically incapable of possessing morality. But when we speak of the” immorality” of pornography the obvious understanding is that someone is making it and someone else is looking at it. The same is true of music. Technically speaking, music is just sound waves, so obviously we’re talking about the process of human beings experiencing and interacting with it. When most people talk about the ‘morality of music’ I understand them to be speaking of it’s moral effect on people. We could ask: “If a rock song plays in the woods and no one hears it, is it immoral?” But that would obviously be a big waste of time. I’m not quite seeing the point or purpose of your particular philosophical argument. In my experience, those who say that “music is amoral” are arguing that music, apart from text and apart from associations, has no ability to affect the listener morally. That is untrue.
Getting back to the original post (what was it again?), denying the moral implications of music as sound is what leads to philosophies like http://www.worshipmatters.com/wp-content/uploads/Does-God-Even-Like-Our…] this :
[quote Bob Kauflin] Did you ever wonder — What kind of music does GOD like? He commands us to make music, so he must take pleasure in it. Does he like modern worship better than hymns? Rock better than country? Folk better than jazz? What if God’s favorite music is opera? The kind of music God likes isn’t determined by a style, genre, beat, or generation.
I’d love to see Kevin weigh in on the morality of objects vs. acts. Had a very long debate w/a relative on that subject once. At least it seemed long. Maybe it just felt long.
Anyway, the conclusion I came to is that it’s kind of pointless to assert that objects do not have morality since all of the objects we care about applying Scripture to were made by someone and are viewed, used, listened to, contemplated, etc. by someone. In the end, it simply doesn’t matter whether the mass of canvas and paint is moral or not because it was a moral act when it was made, will be a moral act as soon as someone looks at it, etc.
Dave, I believe, suggested above somewhere that the painting has no morality until there is shared meaning. This is not necessarily the case. It had morality when it was made and meaning only existed in the mind of its maker. Meaning need not be shared to be moral. And meaning is only one factor. There is purpose and motive. If the artist intended to convey his deep bitterness at God for not making him wealthy, the painting has moral significance in the context of his creation of it, even if he utterly fails to convey that meaning in the piece and no one else ever sees it (or even if all who see it find themselves admiring God instead).
My point is that the morality of the creation can be quite different for one person than for another. But this is a very different thing from saying it is amoral. As for the object itself, I accept that it is technically amoral, but the distinction is completely useless since no one ever looked amorally at an object, or listened amorally to one, or even thought amorally about one.
As soon as we interact in any way with something, it becomes an entity in a moral phenomenon.
To get back to Kevin’s piece a little: what I appreciate most about it is that that he points out how indispensable second premise arguments are. We cannot live biblically without them. And an approach to Scripture and Christian living that sometimes rejects second-premise arguments as a matter of principle while other times employing those arguments is ultimately an incoherent approach. It’s doomed to get arbitrary sooner or later.
(Maybe a good way to sum up my view is that objects are amoral only as long a they are sealed in a box where no one can relate to them in any way)
Anyway, the conclusion I came to is that it’s kind of pointless to assert that objects do not have morality since all of the objects we care about applying Scripture to were made by someone and are viewed, used, listened to, contemplated, etc. by someone. In the end, it simply doesn’t matter whether the mass of canvas and paint is moral or not because it was a moral act when it was made, will be a moral act as soon as someone looks at it, etc.
Dave, I believe, suggested above somewhere that the painting has no morality until there is shared meaning. This is not necessarily the case. It had morality when it was made and meaning only existed in the mind of its maker. Meaning need not be shared to be moral. And meaning is only one factor. There is purpose and motive. If the artist intended to convey his deep bitterness at God for not making him wealthy, the painting has moral significance in the context of his creation of it, even if he utterly fails to convey that meaning in the piece and no one else ever sees it (or even if all who see it find themselves admiring God instead).
My point is that the morality of the creation can be quite different for one person than for another. But this is a very different thing from saying it is amoral. As for the object itself, I accept that it is technically amoral, but the distinction is completely useless since no one ever looked amorally at an object, or listened amorally to one, or even thought amorally about one.
As soon as we interact in any way with something, it becomes an entity in a moral phenomenon.
To get back to Kevin’s piece a little: what I appreciate most about it is that that he points out how indispensable second premise arguments are. We cannot live biblically without them. And an approach to Scripture and Christian living that sometimes rejects second-premise arguments as a matter of principle while other times employing those arguments is ultimately an incoherent approach. It’s doomed to get arbitrary sooner or later.
(Maybe a good way to sum up my view is that objects are amoral only as long a they are sealed in a box where no one can relate to them in any way)
Views expressed are always my own and not my employer's, my church's, my family's, my neighbors', or my pets'. The house plants have authorized me to speak for them, however, and they always agree with me.
[Eric R.] Getting back to the original post (what was it again?), denying the moral implications of music as sound is what leads to philosophies like http://www.worshipmatters.com/wp-content/uploads/Does-God-Even-Like-Our…] this :Deferring for the moment your other questions for lack of time (though I do want to get to them as this subject interests me), I would ask this: What kind of music does God like? Where does he state that for us? Given we are talking about arguments from 2nd premises and such, where are we even given enough information to be able to come to a conclusion about what God likes in music? Most of what we can conclusively say about God, he has told us. He hates lying, he hates divorce, he cannot look upon sin, and so forth.
[quote Bob Kauflin] Did you ever wonder — What kind of music does GOD like? He commands us to make music, so he must take pleasure in it. Does he like modern worship better than hymns? Rock better than country? Folk better than jazz? What if God’s favorite music is opera? The kind of music God likes isn’t determined by a style, genre, beat, or generation.
Personally, I avoid music that sounds too much like the world, because of its associations and such. And I would also avoid offering to God in worship songs that I find trivial, silly, or inappropriate for a worship setting. And any songs with doctrinally incorrect texts are also out. But even having eliminated the all of those, what do I really know about what God likes in music? If music itself can be morally wrong, then maybe some of the trivial tunes in many hymnbooks are dishonoring to God, regardless of the hearts of the people attempting to use them for worship.
I’m not sure we can answer the question “What kind of music does God like?”
Dave Barnhart
Aaron,
Just a couple of things:
1. If the painting in your example, painted to express ideas against God instead causes all who view it to admire God, is it then a morally good painting, or is it both? (Or does it have any?)
2. I agree that considering morality of an object in the abstract is not really useful in real life. That’s one of the reasons I don’t think it’s actually useful to talk about music being inherently moral (on it’s own, apart from interacting with humans). I simply don’t believe people evaluate music that way even when they think they are. What is more interesting is evaluating its interaction with us in context. However, that is complicated given that different people can have different perceptions, and once we evaluate in context, we are immediately mixing in association and appropriateness, which I would argue are the actual moral qualities being evaluated.
I am interested in your notion that if something has a different morality for each person that perceives it, that is still different from amorality. Does that mean you believe there is such a thing as variable morality? An interesting thought …
OK, I’ve wasted enough thread space on this rabbit trail, and I’m well aware that my view is, shall we say, a minority view in fundamentalism. I do question Don’s view above that he could cooperate with someone who had different choices but the same philosophy (i.e. music is moral, but CCM is OK), vs. someone who made essentially the same choices, but with a different philosophy (i.e. music is inherently amoral, but only music without strong worldly association is OK). I much prefer the music in most fundamental churches (though I lean toward high-church sound) to what would be the norm in evangelical churches, and I would generally oppose going toward the musical sound we associate with a lot of CCM, since it doesn’t sound much different from the world’s music, even though I would disagree with most in the fundamental church on how I got there.
I agree with the main thrust that second premise arguments are necessary. However, we can’t just make up the second premise, and then make strong application from that. The second premise should be something that can be shown to be true. If one makes an application that avoiding evil means one needs to avoid a certain type of music, one had better be prepared to show that that type of music is, in fact, evil. If you are avoiding it on other grounds, then no such proof is necessary.
Just a couple of things:
1. If the painting in your example, painted to express ideas against God instead causes all who view it to admire God, is it then a morally good painting, or is it both? (Or does it have any?)
2. I agree that considering morality of an object in the abstract is not really useful in real life. That’s one of the reasons I don’t think it’s actually useful to talk about music being inherently moral (on it’s own, apart from interacting with humans). I simply don’t believe people evaluate music that way even when they think they are. What is more interesting is evaluating its interaction with us in context. However, that is complicated given that different people can have different perceptions, and once we evaluate in context, we are immediately mixing in association and appropriateness, which I would argue are the actual moral qualities being evaluated.
I am interested in your notion that if something has a different morality for each person that perceives it, that is still different from amorality. Does that mean you believe there is such a thing as variable morality? An interesting thought …
OK, I’ve wasted enough thread space on this rabbit trail, and I’m well aware that my view is, shall we say, a minority view in fundamentalism. I do question Don’s view above that he could cooperate with someone who had different choices but the same philosophy (i.e. music is moral, but CCM is OK), vs. someone who made essentially the same choices, but with a different philosophy (i.e. music is inherently amoral, but only music without strong worldly association is OK). I much prefer the music in most fundamental churches (though I lean toward high-church sound) to what would be the norm in evangelical churches, and I would generally oppose going toward the musical sound we associate with a lot of CCM, since it doesn’t sound much different from the world’s music, even though I would disagree with most in the fundamental church on how I got there.
I agree with the main thrust that second premise arguments are necessary. However, we can’t just make up the second premise, and then make strong application from that. The second premise should be something that can be shown to be true. If one makes an application that avoiding evil means one needs to avoid a certain type of music, one had better be prepared to show that that type of music is, in fact, evil. If you are avoiding it on other grounds, then no such proof is necessary.
Dave Barnhart
[dcbii] I am interested in your notion that if something has a different morality for each person that perceives it, that is still different from amorality. Does that mean you believe there is such a thing as variable morality? An interesting thought …That would be pomo-rality, I think!
[dcbii] OK, I’ve wasted enough thread space on this rabbit trail, and I’m well aware that my view is, shall we say, a minority view in fundamentalism. I do question Don’s view above that he could cooperate with someone who had different choices but the same philosophy (i.e. music is moral, but CCM is OK), vs. someone who made essentially the same choices, but with a different philosophy (i.e. music is inherently amoral, but only music without strong worldly association is OK).I thought I qualified that a bit in one of my later responses. I think that the person with the different philosophy would inevitably express himself in a way that would demand some distancing at some point. And my cooperation with people who say they have the same philosophy but different applications would be ‘applications within a range’. In other words, I would question someone who said their philosophy was the same as mine but in application were wildly different, like incorporating rap or grunge or something like that. The range I can tolerate to some extent would allow for, say, Southern Gospel style, but it wouldn’t be my choice for a steady diet in our church etc.
[dcbii] I much prefer the music in most fundamental churches (though I lean toward high-church sound) to what would be the norm in evangelical churches, and I would generally oppose going toward the musical sound we associate with a lot of CCM, since it doesn’t sound much different from the world’s music, even though I would disagree with most in the fundamental church on how I got there.Your applications makes me think that at bottom you and I don’t think that differently. We probably aren’t communicating our views as precisely as we think.
[dcbii] I agree with the main thrust that second premise arguments are necessary. However, we can’t just make up the second premise, and then make strong application from that. The second premise should be something that can be shown to be true. If one makes an application that avoiding evil means one needs to avoid a certain type of music, one had better be prepared to show that that type of music is, in fact, evil. If you are avoiding it on other grounds, then no such proof is necessary.I agree with you here.
Maranatha!
Don Johnson
Jer 33.3
[Mike Durning] Don, I don’t believe the things themselves, either in genre or style, possess any moral qualities.You know Mike, it’s interesting to note that movies made in America are transported all over the world. Subtitles are added so that they can be shown in various countries. But the music is never changed and always has the same effect on the audience. It would seem that there are some universal communicational attributes of music that transcend cultural context.
Why is it that my voice always seems to be loudest when I am saying the dumbest things?
[Chip Van Emmerik]But what does it communicate? It doesn’t communicate propositional truth or else they wouldn’t need the subtitles.[Mike Durning] Don, I don’t believe the things themselves, either in genre or style, possess any moral qualities.You know Mike, it’s interesting to note that movies made in America are transported all over the world. Subtitles are added so that they can be shown in various countries. But the music is never changed and always has the same effect on the audience. It would seem that there are some universal communicational attributes of music that transcend cultural context.
-------
Greg Long, Ed.D. (SBTS)
Pastor of Adult Ministries
Grace Church, Des Moines, IA
Adjunct Instructor
School of Divinity
Liberty University
Discussion